Showing posts with label Seminar in Finance (Ass. 8). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Seminar in Finance (Ass. 8). Show all posts

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Pushing Back the Boundaries

1. Introduction
§ Debt markets → the most important developments have been continued deregulation and regulatory harmonization
§ Eurobond, Euro-medium ten note (EMTN) and Euro-commercial paper (ECP) markets
§ Access to the Eurobond market → be made less cumbersome by the rapidly growing acceptance of EMTNs by investors who traditionally purchased Eurobonds
§ Access to the Euromarkets → has always been determined less by overt regulation than by unofficial or investor-driven market practice
§ Current economic climate → regulatory developments which have facilitated access to the securities markets have been partially offset by investors' concerns over credit risk
§ Ratings have become increasingly important → unrated entities will find it more difficult than before to borrow via a Eurobond offering
§ Financial covenants for corporate issuers → more restrictive → as investors try to protect themselves against downgrading and defaults
§ Domestic markets have also continued to benefit from deregulation and regulatory harmonization:
i. Standards of prospectus and listing requirements converge → issuers find it less expensive and time consuming to issue outside their home market
ii. Deregulation often permits the issuance of a more sophisticated range of instruments than was previously allowed
iii. The distinction between international and domestic securities markets has become increasingly blurred → it has become correspondingly easier for issuers to find an appropriate investor base for their securities
§ The international equity markets → have traditionally been far smaller in issuance volume terms than their debt counterpart → because of regulatory differences and equities tend to be denominated in the currency of the issuer and settled in its home market

2. Europe
§ The international bond market has traditionally had its headquarters in London
§ Eurobond market → can be accessed by institutions ranging from small, unrated corporations to large supranational institutions
§ The liberalization → has increased the pressure on other regulatory authorities to bring their regulations into line
i. The strongest candidates for change are the French, Dutch and Swiss markets
§ Banking industry is pressing for the securities industry to be forced to comply with bank-style capital adequacy requirements
i. Large corporations and state and sovereign entities might find it more difficult to access the markets
§ Continental European equity markets still differ considerably in structure, liquidity and regulation
§ Supply of equity is increasing → as family-run businesses are sold off by a generation that does not wish to continue running these businesses
§ The European investor base is becoming more institutionalized
§ Admission Directive → coordinates the conditions for the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing → by setting minimum requirements which have to be met by any company seeking a listing
§ European Commission (EC) Directives → should mean greater efficiency and transparency in the markets for public securities → both debt and equity

3. United States
§ The US authorities still operate a separate environment
§ All public offerings of securities in the US → must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933
§ The appeal of the US public markets for foreign issuers → has traditionally been limited to larger borrowers with the time
§ By limiting the extraterritorial impact of the existing regulations and extending the exemption for private placements → the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has made it easier and cheaper for foreign borrowers to access the US debt and equity markets

4. Emerging Markets
§ One of the most significant trends → has been the increase in companies and financial institutions from emerging markets seeking to raise capital outside their home markets
§ The size of predicted capital flows from these countries → has serious implications for the international securities markets
§ The economic and political background of the companies whose shares are being offered → involve particular challenges when the shares are being offered internationally

5. New Products
§ Most encouraging for potential issuers of securities → is the increased range of instruments and currencies available
§ Development in derivatives as well as a proliferation of hybrid debt / equity instruments → have allowed issuers far greater flexibility in choosing securities
§ These new instruments → require a far greater understanding of the legal and accounting environments of:
i. the jurisdiction from which the securities are issued
ii. Of those into which they may be sold
§ Some of the most powerful instruments and structures → have developed simply as a response to the increased internationalization of world securities markets
§ Global offerings → allow issuers to gain access to a more diverse investor base than was available to them previously → enabling them to lower their cost of funds and to increase name recognition
§ Debt markets
→ global bond issues are becoming an increasingly popular tool for certain of the larger borrowers
§ Development of the Global Depository Receipt (GDR) → another indication of the increasing internationalization of the international securities markets
§ GDR → a capital raising structure that provides issuers with a means to tap international capital markets through the simultaneous issuance of a single, fungible security in the US and other markets
§ The GDR → is offered simultaneously in several jurisdictions
§ GDRs → have facilitated offerings of securities from Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, India, China, Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore → without obliging investors to operate within the confines of the local trading and settlement systems
§ The general trend is clear and it is a positive one for issuers of debt and equity securities
§ By giving issuers access to a greater diversity of markets and so a greater number of potential investors → these trends should also lower borrowers' costs of borrowing

Sunday, April 13, 2008

Foreign Ownership and Investment: Evidence from Korea

1. Introduction
§ Korean equity market → opened to foreign investors in January 1992
§ Maximum foreign investment limits → eliminated in May 1998
§ Effects of increase in foreign ownership → attract many attentions
§ Researches found → firm’s investment depends on the availability of internal funds
§ The importance of financial factors → is attributed to higher costs of external finance arising from information asymmetry and agency costs in an imperfect capital market
§ This study
→ focuses on the level of foreign ownership as a segmenting criterion
§ If financial intermediaries consider that foreigners favour firms with low information asymmetry → firms with high foreign ownership are able to raise external funds at low cost
§ If foreign investors have better monitoring skills than domestic investors in developing countries → foreign firms have less managerial agency problems
§ Test whether firms owned by foreigners face less credit constraint than domestically owned firms → main empirical findings:
i. Cash flow sensitivity of investment ↓ as foreign ownership ↑
ii. After 1998 → effect on foreign ownership on financial constraints became stronger

2. Relevant Literature and Hypothesis Formulation
§ Modigliani and Miller → Firms investment depend on the profit opportunity
§ Empirical literature → found that firms’ investment decision depend on financial factors → availability of internal funds
§ Why investment is sensitive to internal funds in imperfect financial markets → two streams:
i. Focus on lemon premium → firms must pay on external finance → firms tend to rely internal funds to carry out performance
ii. Studies attribute the importance of internal funds to managerial agency problems
§ Managers → not the owners → may pursue their own interest → not the stakeholders’ interest
§ Managers tend to spend all available funds on investment projects at their own discretion
§ Both stream of literature predict → the availability of internal funds does affect investment
§ Investment of more financially constrained firms respond more sensitively to changes in cash flow
§ Concentrated ownership → leads to less liquidity-constraint
§ Managers’ ownership stakes in their firms increase → investment-cash flow sensitivity increase
§ Cash flow sensitivity decrease → after a certain level of insider holding
§ Most developing countries →have recently experienced an increase in the equity share of foreigners
§ FDI → eases credit constraints by bringing in capital
§ Ivory Coast → foreign firms were less credit-constrained than domestic firms
i. FDI → reduces firm-level financing constraints
§ Present study → examine whether financial constraints are mitigated as a result of a favorable financing position in market
§ Foreign investors prefer → equity shares in firms with low information asymmetry to those with higher information asymmetry
§ Japanese market → Foreigners prefer large firms, firms with good performance, low risk, and low leverage
§ Swedish firms → foreigners prefer large firms, firms paying low dividends, and firms with large cash position
§ Czech firms → foreign investors seek safe and profitable firms where they can exert influence on corporate governance
§ Financial constraints model and managerial discretion model → one expect cash floe sensitivity of investment to be lower in foreign owned firms than in domestically owned firms

3. Model and Method
§ Model
i. q is the only determinant of investment and no other financial variable should matter
ii. A test for existence of financing constraints amounts to a test for null hypothesis
iii. Test → whether cash flow sensitivity of investment differs across foreign ownership structure
iv. Test → whether the complete opening of the Korean equity market has effected the degree of financial constraints
v. q model has many limitation → difficult to measure q → because average q is equal to marginal q under strict condition
vi. Forbes → derived an Euler equation
a. From the model of maximization of the firm value → under the assumption that dividend must be non-negative
b. Implying that external financing is costly due to information asymmetry
§ Method
i. OLS for dynamic investment models → result in biased estimates → because of endogeneity and heterogeneity problems
ii. Sales and cash flow depends on technological shock
iii. The presence of lagged investment-to-capital ratio as an explanatory variable → bias the coefficient estimates from the OLS
iv. The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation → widely used for dynamic panel model → depends:
a. On the adoption of appropriate instruments
b. On the efficient elimination of unobserved firm effect
v. Arellano and Bond → two specification tests:
a. A Sargan test for over identifying restriction → used to test for the validity of instruments
b. A test of serial correlation of errors terms → used to detect the presence of unobserved individual effect
§ Data and definition of variables
i. A firm-level panel data set → constructed from the Korea Investors Service-Financial Analysis System
ii. Data set → consist of 5084 observations of 371 firms used → period 1992-2002
iii. High foreign ownership → based on two criteria:
a. More than 5.88% foreign ownership
b. More than upper quartile foreign ownership
iv. The dummy variable High → has a value of one for firms with high foreign ownership and zero

4. Empirical Result
§ Sargan test result for over-identifying restrictions → indicate that the instruments used are valid
§ q-model and Euler equation → suggest that:
i. The availability of internal funds does effect investment levels
ii. Persistence is found in a firm’s investment from significant estimates in the lagged investment-to-capital ratio
§ q-model and Euler equation → the cash flow sensitivity for firms with high foreign ownership is statistically insignificant
i. It suggest → financial constraints faced by firm decrease as foreign ownership increases
§ Managers of a firm with high foreign ownership → less likely to use cash flow at their discretion due to improving corporate governance system
§ In the Korean Stock Market → found that estimates in cash flow are lower after 1998
§ It is conjectured → the opening of the stock market is surely one of the factors in the mitigation of financial constraints
§ Found → liquidity constraints are reduced in firms with low foreign ownership
§ Cash-flow sensitivity in firms with high foreign ownership → statistically insignificant regardless of time period
§ Liquidity constraints → not statistically significant in firms with high foreign ownership
§ With non-linear relationship between foreign ownership structure and the value of the firm → foreign ownership seems to have a linear relationship to financial constraints

Thursday, April 10, 2008

How Corrupt is Wall Street?

§ Kanjinal → a Queens pediatrician → claimed he lost $500,000 investing in INSP
§ The Securities and Exchange Commission → launched a probe into practices at 10 firms → while the Justice Dept. is pondering an enquiry or its own
§ The widening scandal → plunged Wall Street into crisis
o Because many more individuals lost money in the recent market collapse
§ Relationship between analyst and their investment banking colleagues → grow
o Because it comes on the heels of several other scandals → raise big questions about how Wall Street operates
§ Enron Corp.’s collapse
o Many firms may have made a bundle investing in the partnership
o Those same firms advised clients to hold Enron stock virtually → until it went bankrupt
o Makes Wall Street seem rigged for the benefit of insiders as never before
§ Entire economy depends on the financial system → to raise and allocate capital
o Financial system → is built on the integrity on its information
§ Investors hesitate to put money into stocks
o It could easily put a damper on the economy
→ if companies are less willing or less able to raise capital on Wall Street
§ Wall Street → was always struggled with conflict of interest
§ An investment bank → is a business built on the conflict of interest → the same institution serve two masters:
o The companies → sells stocks, issued bonds, or executes mergers → want high price and low interest rates on their bonds
o The investors → it advised → low price and high interest rates
§ The bank gets fee from both → trades stocks and bonds on its own behalf
§ Mega banks → are allowed to do everything from trading stocks to lending money and managing pension funds
§ Chinese walls → were supposed to keep the bankers honest and free from corruption
§ The final blow → was the tide of money that flooded over Wall Street during the great tech bubble
§ The bubble burst in the spring 2000 → wiping out more than $4 trillion in investor wealth
§ The fact → bubble market allowed the creation of bubble companies, entities designed more with an eye to making money off investors
§ A feeding frenzy set in as rivals fought to grab a big share of the market to bring companies public
§ Investors took everything at face value → understandable
§ Analyst disparage stocks as “crap” and “junk”
o They threaten to thrust Wall Street into the sort of public relations nightmare
o All the ingredients are present:
· Publicity-hungry attorneys general, packs of plaintiffs’ lawyers, and potential congressional hearings
§ More explosive documents may be on the way
§ Spitzer and the SEC → seek the analyst’ recommendation and their potential conflicts of interest
§ Analyst were being paid to help the firms’ banking clients
§ If the analyst covering other industries at the firm harbored similar doubts about the companies they hawked → the number of claimants will expand exponentially
§ If the prosecutors conclude that firms are guilty of systemic fraud → research directors and other high-ranking execs could be vulnerable
§ New rules forcing analyst to limit and disclose contracts with investment banker colleagues
§ Analyst who work at investment banks often work against investors
§ Analysts are under pressure from the companies they cover
→ as well as from big institutional clients who may own the stock → to give positive ratings
§ Analysts also need to shine in surveys → in which money managers vote for their favorite stock pickers → they spend too much time lobbying clients rather that crunching numbers
§ The biggest factor contaminating the system is COMPENSATION
§ Analyst’ pay → tied to how much investment banking business they bring in
§ Experts say → a lot of the corruption oozing from Wall Street has to do with an erosion in investment banking ethics and practices
§ Slashed commission → meant the firms were forced to derive more revenues from investment banking business
§ Investment bankers generated mega profits from secretly investing in Enron’s hidden partnership
§ Wall Street itself → used to have much more of an interest initial public offerings is way of its 200 high
§ It’s unlikely that Wall Street → can sustain its profitability
§ Firms has already taken some steps → such as eliminating direct reporting by analyst to investment bankers
§ Focusing on increased disclosure will do little to end the abuse
§ The Street should take great pains to monitor itself in an effort to restore investors’ confidence